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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR - 6 2017 
RE: Ostler v. Utah State Retirement Board, Appellate Case No. 20160220 
Citation of Supplemental Authority 
Dear Ms. Collins, 
[n the above-referenced matter, and pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(j), the Utah 
State Retirement Board ('"Board"), together with Salt Lake Community College ('•SLCC") 
(collectively "Appellees"), hereby provides this citation of the following supplemental authority: 
Ramsay v. Retirement Board 
2017 UT App 17 
Case No. 20150574-CA 
Filed January 26, 20 I 7 
[n Ramsay, this Court held that the discovery rule did not toll the three-year statute of limitations 
that applied to the appellants' claims for pension benefits and the underlying employer 
contributions. 2017 UT App 17, ,i 19. The Court therefore affirmed the State Retirement 
Board's holding that the appellants were only entitled to recover benefits for the prior three 
years, and not the entire length of their employment. Id. ,i,i 2, 8. When the Appellees filed their 
briefs on September 6, 2016, the Ramsay decision was pending. The Board cited to the pending 
case on page 30 of its Brief of Appellee, in reference to its argument in Point n that the Board 
correctly dismissed Ostler's claims as time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of 
limitations. The Ramsay decision similarly relates to Point [ (pgs. 10-19) of SLCC's Brief of 
Respondent and Real Party in Interest, that Ostler's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
The Ramsay decision is attached hereto. 
In addition, the Board has become aware of a mis-cite to a Board Resolution on page 30 and 
Addendum I of its brief, which should have been to Board Resolution 2013-05. The correct 
Board Resolution is also attached for the Court's reference. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sincerely, 
David B. Hansen 
Attorney for the Board 
Cc: Florence M. Vincent, Attorney for Petitioner 
2 
Erin T. Middleton 
Attorney for SLCC 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FlLE:0 
UTAH APPELL4TE COURTS 
2017 UT App 17 
THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORI RAMSAY AND DAN SMALLING, 
Petitioners, 
V. 
RETIREMENT BOARD AND KANE COUNTY HU~IAN 




Filed January 26, 2017 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Brian S. King, Attorney for Petitioners 
David B. Hansen and Erin L. Gill, Attorneys for 
Respondent Retirement Board 
Timothy C. Houpt, Mark D. Tolman, and C. Michael 
Judd, Attorneys for Respondent Kane County 
Human Resource Special Service District 
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORi'vlE authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES 
J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred. 
ORME, Judge: 
<J[l Lori Ramsay and Dan Smalling seek judicial review of the 
Utah State Retirement Board's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the Kane County Human Resource Special Service 
District, which operates the Kane County Hospital. Ramsay and 
Smalling contend that the board erred in granting summary 
judgment because the equitable discovery rule tolled the 
applicable statute of limitations. \iVe uphold the board's decision. 
.JAN !. Pi 2017 
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Ramsay 1.'. Retire111e11t Board 
BACKGROUND1 
<jf2 In 1993, the special service district, acting as a subdivision 
of the state of Utah, established a defined contribution program 
for its employees. Specifically, the district established a 401(k) 
program and offered to match a certain percentage of its 
employees' contributions to their accounts. Lori Ramsay and 
Dan Smalling, two employees of the hospital, enrolled in the 
401(k) program in 1994 and 1995 respectively. 
113 At some point in 2006 or 2007, for reasons not pertinent to 
this appeal, the Internal Revenue Service notified some of the 
hospital's employees that it had frozen their 401(k) accounts, 
prompting Ramsay to inquire of the Utah Retirement Systems 
(URS) about her retirement benefits. In addition to responding to 
Ramsay's inquiry, URS sent Ramsay a questionnaire that it used 
to determine a public employer's eligibility to participate in URS. 
Ramsay passed this questionnaire on to the hospital, which 
completed it and returned it to URS. 
114 After receiving the completed questionnaire, URS 
informed the hospital that it was required to participate in URS. 
At this time, the hospital first learned that its retirement program 
did not comply with the Utah State Retirement and Insurance 
Benefit Act (the Act). Specifically, the hospital learned that the 
Act required public employers who provide a defined 
contribution program, like a 401(k), to also provide a defined 
benefit program, whereby employees receive pensions upon 
retirement. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202(3) (LexisNexis 
1. "In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, 
we view 'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party' and recite 
the facts accordingly." Ockey v. Club Jam, 2014 UT App 126, 1 2 
n.2, 328 P.3d 880 (quoting Orvis v. Jolmso11, 2008 UT 2, 1 6, 177 
P.3d 600). vVe apply the same standard in reviewing a summary 
judgment entered in an administrative proceeding. 
20150574-CA 2 2017 UT App 17 
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2015).2 Although the hospital provided 401 (k) benefits for its 
employees, it never contributed funds to URS for employee 
pensions. As a result, URS demanded that the hospital 
retroactively pay contributions to URS on behalf of all of its 
employees from 1993, vvhen the hospital first offered the 401(k) 
plan, to 2009, when it elected nonparticipation in URS in 
accordance with a new statutory provision. See supra note 2. The 
hospital refused, and URS filed a Notice of Board Action. 
'l[S Meanwhile, Ramsay and Smalling sued URS, the hospital, 
and an insurance agency that assisted the hospital in establishing 
the 40l(k) program, seeking to recover their pension benefits. 
Each defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Ramsay and 
Smalling failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not 
pursuing their claims before the board. The district court agreed 
and dismissed that case. Aftenvard, Ramsay and Smalling 
intervened in the administrative proceeding pending before the 
board, initiated by URS against the hospital. 
1[6 In 2013, the hospital filed a motion for summary 
judgment in that proceeding, arguing that URS's claim for 
recovery was limited to three years under the applicable statute 
of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(4) (LexisNexis 
2012). URS, along with Ramsay and Smalling, opposed the 
motion, arguing that the limitations period should be tolled 
under the equitable discovery rule. The board's hearing officer 
granted the hospital's motion, concluding that "[t]here is no 
evidence in the record that the Hospital actively or affirmatively 
2. In 2009, the Utah Legislature amended the provision to allow 
special service district hospitals to 11 make an election of 
nonparticipation as an employer for retirement programs under 
this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202(5)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2015). The hospital immediately elected nonparticipation in URS. 
Aside from this amendment, other changes to the relevant 
statutes have no bearing on the issues before us, so we otherwise 
cite the current codification of the statutes for ease of reference. 
20150574-CA 3 2017 UT App 17 
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Ramsay P. Retirement Board 
concealed its 401(k) plan from URS. \Nithout such evidence, the 
concealment version of the equitable discovery rule does not 
apply." Thus, the hearing officer limited the hospital's liability to 
the three years immediately preceding its election of 
nonparticipation in URS. 
917 Following the hearing officer's summary judgment order, 
the hospital settled with all but six of its current and former 
employees \.vho had a claim to unpaid pension contributions 
arising during the three-year period.3 It then paid contributions 
to URS for its employees who did not settle, including Ramsay 
and Smalling. Soon after, the board filed a motion to dismiss 
"because all issues in the Board's Request have been resolved 
and the case . . . is moot." The hearing officer granted the 
motion. 
1{8 \Nith URS's claims dismissed, the hospital sought 
dismissal of Ramsay's and Smalling' s claims as well. In a motion 
for summary judgment, it argued that the claims for 
contributions between 2006 and 2009 were moot, because they 
had now been paid, and that the claims prior to 2006 were 
untimely, because they were outside the three-year window. In 
response, Ramsay and Smalling claimed that the limitations 
period should be tolled under the equitable discovery rule. The 
hearing officer granted the hospital's motion and dismissed 
Ramsay's and Smalling's claims, finalizing the administrative 
proceeding. Ramsay and Smalling now seek our review of the 
board's disposition. 
3. In 2012, the Utah Legislature created a grant program to assist 
special service districts in resolving retirement liability. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-9-5 (LexisNexis 2013). The hospital utilized a 
grant, together \.Vith its own funds, to finance the settlements. 
20150574-CA 4 2017 UT App 17 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ci[9 Ramsay and Smalling claim that the hearing officer erred 
when he refused to toll the three-year limitations period under 
the equitable discovery doctrine. "The applicability of a statute 
of limitations and ... the discovery rule are questions of law, 
\.vhich we review for correctness." Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67, 
<JI 10, 245 P.3d 731 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
1(10 The parties agree that the three-year limitations period 
applies to Ramsay's and Smalling's claims.4 See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-2-305(4) (LexisNexis 2012). The parties also agree that 
more than three years have passed since most of their causes of 
action accrued. Ramsay and Smalling contend, however, that the 
hearing officer erroneously granted summary judgment with 
respect to these claims because the equitable discovery rule 
tolled the limitations period. 5 
4. Although Ramsay and Smalling refer in their opening brief to 
limitations law related to the Governmental Immunity Act of 
Utah, they concede in their reply brief that they "do not seek to 
raise that statutory discovery rule now." We therefore decline to 
analyze this act's limitations provisions. 
5. Ramsay and Smalling also argue that the hospital was an 
employer "subject to the requirements" of the Act. But this 
proceeding for judicial review arises from a summary judgment 
motion in which the hospital stipulated, for the sole purpose of 
the motion, that it was an employer subject to the Act, so we 
have no occasion to consider the question. 
20150574-CA 5 2017 UT App 17 
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I. The Discovery Rule Does \lot Apply to Ramsay's and 
Smalling'::; Claims. 
9111 Before \.Ve may consider ·whether the equitable discovery 
rule applies, Ramsay and Smalling must show, as a threshold 
matter, that they were unaware of "the facts underlying the 
cause of action in time to reasonably comply with the limitations 
period." Berneau v. 1'v'Iarti110, 2009 UT 87, <JI 23, 223 P.3d 1128. See 
Gar:a v. Burnett, 2013 UT 66, <JI 10, 321 P.3d 1104 (treating this 
showing as "[a]n essential prerequisite to the application of the 
discovery rule"). Additionally, "[t]he limitations period is 
postponed only by belated discovery of key facts and not by 
delayed discovery of legal theories." Anderson v. Dean lNitter 
Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
<r[12 Ramsay and Smalling claim they were unaware that the 
hospital's defined contribution plan "obligated [the hospital] to 
provide full retirement benefits," that the hospital "had an 
obligation to fund ... service credits," and that they "were 
entitled to retirement benefits above and beyond the benefits 
they had been promised." These assertions, however, do not 
represent unknown facts. Rather, they are legal conclusions. 
Ramsay's and Smalling's contention that they did not "recognize 
the legal significance" of the plan is irrelevant.6 Ignorance or 
6. It is also unsurprising. vVho would have guessed that an 
employer's well-intentioned design to help employees by 
establishing a 401(k) plan for them and matching their 
contributions would trigger the obligation to fund a pension for 
them as well? This "in for a dime; in for a dollar" philosophy 
would appear to be bad policy, as it \.vould tend to chill public 
employers not in a position to fund the full array of URS benefits 
from offering at least something to their employees. And the 
Legislature came around to this view, at least as concerns special 
service district hospitals and nursing care facilities, and changed 
the law. See supra note 2. 
20150574-CA 6 2017 UT App 17 
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Ramsay v. Retirement Board 
obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not 
prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Russell Packard 
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, <j[ 20, 108 P.3d 741. The pertinent 
information was available to Ramsay and Smalling in the form 
of their 401(k) plans and a readily available published stah1te.7 
They simply failed to avail themselves of this information and to 
more timely assert their claim to pension contributions. 
II. Even If vVe Assume Ramsay and Smalling Made Their Initial 
Showing, They Are Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling. 
'fI13 Ramsay and Smalling argue that the discovery rule 
operates to toll the three-year statute of limitations. "Generally, a 
cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations 
begins to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action[.)" Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 
P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1992) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Under certain circumstances, however, "the 
discovery rule may operate to toll the period of limitations until 
the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action." 
vValker Dntg Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The discovery 
rule applies 
7. vVe recognize this is something of a legal fiction. Health 
professionals are not going to sit around reading the Utah Code. 
And no normal person, upon learning he or she can now 
participate in a 401(k), is going to think: "vVow. I bet this entitles 
me to a pension, too. I better check the applicable statutes." But 
so long as the hospital did not conceal information from Ramsay 
and Smalling and so long as no exceptional circumstances exist, 
there is no getting around the fact that once they were provided 
with a 401(k) by their public entity employer, they were aware of 
all the facts necessary to make a demand for pension 
contributions as well, tmder the law as it then existed. See 
Anderson v. Dean iVitter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
20150574-CA 7 2017 UT App 17 
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(1) in situations \vhere the discovery rule is 
mandated by statute; (2) in situations where a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of 
action because of the defendant's concealment or 
misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational 
or unjust, regardless of any showing that the 
defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause 
of action. 
Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129 (internal citations omitted). Statutes that 
mandate the application of the discovery rule contain a 
"statutory discovery rule." See Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, 'I[ 21. 
"' [C]oncealment' and 'exceptional circumstances,'" on the other 
hand, comprise the "equitable discovery rule." Id. at 'I[ 25. 
Ramsay and Smalling do not claim that the discovery rule is 
mandated by statute. Instead, they focus their discussion on the 
other two variants of the discovery rule. vVe therefore do the 
same. 
9114 First, the concealment version of the equitable discovery 
rule tolls the limitations period if "a plaintiff does not become 
aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's 
concealment or misleading conduct[.]" Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129. 
This is "essentially a claim of equitable estoppel, whereby a 
defendant who causes a delay in the bringing of a cause of action 
is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense 
to the action." Id. at 1129-30. 
1{15 The hospital did nothing to prevent Ramsay and Smalling 
from discovering the full extent of their available retirement 
benefits. Indeed, the hospital was equally unaware of its 
obligation to provide such benefits. "In no case ... is mere 
silence or failure to disclose sufficient in itself to constitute 
fraudulent concealment." Colosimo z,. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 
UT 2.3, 1[ 44, 136 P.3d 806 (brackets, citation, and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, \Ve conclude that the hospital 
2013057-l-CA 8 2017 UT App 17 
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did not prevent Ramsay and Smalling from discovering their 
cause of action. 
CU16 Second, under the exceptional circumstances prong of the 
equitable discovery rule, the limitations period is tolled "where 
the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application 
of the general rule would be irrational or unjust." Russell Packard, 
2005 UT 14, 11 25. Whether enforcing the limitations period 
would be unjust depends on a balancing test that weighs "[t]he 
hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff 
... [against] any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of 
proof caused by the passage of time." Myers v. tvicDonald, 635 
P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981). 
~(17 Ramsay and Smalling were not prejudiced by the 
application of the statute of limitations in the hospital's favor. 
Instead, they serendipitously received three years of unexpected 
pension benefits through the happenstance of a statute no longer 
applicable to them. In contrast, the hospital, in addition to 
suffering financial burdens from paying the "missed" benefits, 
·would struggle in any suit it brought against the insurance 
agency who advised it, as more than two decades have passed 
since the agency assisted the hospital in establishing the 401(k) 
program, and the applicable statute of limitations has no doubt 
long since run. Such a suit would entail "surprise[] through the 
revival of [a claim] that [has] been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared." Id. at 86 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
<ff 18 Because the hospital did not conceal the cause of action 
from Ramsay and Smalling, and because the application of the 
limitations period is not irrational or unjust, Ramsay and 
Smalling are not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations 
period. 
20130374-CA 9 2017 UT App 17 
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CONCLUSION 
<[19 Ramsay and Smalling have not established that they 
lacked knowledge of essential facts relative to their claims 
against the hospital for unpaid pension contributions. Nor have 
they demonstrated that the hospital fraudulently concealed the 
existence of their causes of action or that the application of the 
statute of limitations was unjust. Accordingly, the hearing officer 
did not err in granting summary judgment to the hospital and in 
dismissing Ramsay's and Smalling's claims, and we decline to 
disturb the board's decision. 
20130374-CA 10 2017 UT App 17 
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RESOLUTION #2013-05 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
September 13, 2013 
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated§ 49-11-613 establishes an appeals procedure to determine "any 
dispute regarding a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right under this title ... ;" and 
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated§ 49-11-613(9) allows the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to 
make rules to implement its appeals procedure; and 
WHEREAS, since March 16, 1994, the Utah State Retirement Office's ("URS") practice has been to 
retroactively collect unpaid contributions back to this date; and 
WHEREAS, URS repays overpaid retirement contributions to participating employers upon learning that 
they are overpaid; and 
WHEREAS, the Board-appointed Hearing Officer's recent decisions in both the Utah State Retirement 
Board v. URMMA, File No. 11-09R, and Utah State Retirement Board v. Kane County Hospital, File No. 
09-22R, apply a three year statute of limitations to the collection of unpaid retirement contributions 
from participation employers by URS; and 
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated § 49-11-203(1)(k) requires the Board to "develop broad policy for the 
long-term operation of the various systems, plans, and programs under broad discretion and power to 
perform the board's policymaking functions, including the specific authority to interpret and define any 
provision or term under this title when the board or office provides written documentation which 
demonstrates that the interpretation or definition promotes uniformity in the administration of the 
systems or maintains the actuarial soundness of the systems, plans or programs;" and 
WHEREAS, the Board desires to create a policy governing how URS shall apply a statute of limitations 
when resolving disputes regarding a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right under Utah Code 
Annotated Title 49 in order to create uniformity in the administration of the systems and to maintain 
the actuarial soundness of the systems, plans and programs; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, a cause of action arises under Utah Code Annotated § 49-11-613 
when a payment is or should have been paid, service credit is or should have been granted, notice is or 
should have been provided, or a claim is or should have been made. 
THEREFORE, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the three year statute of limitations to bring a claim based on a 
liability created by a statute of the state that is found in Utah Code Annotated § 788-2-305 applies to 
actions brought under Utah Code Annotated § 49-11-613, unless otherwise specifically limited by Utah 
Code Annotated Title 49 (such as Utah Code Annotated§ 49-21-401(10)), or by policy or contract. 
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RESOLUTION #2013-05 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (CONTINUED) 
THEREFORE, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the common law equitable discovery rule shall apply to actions 
brought under Utah Code Annotated§ 49-11-613, but only, as outlined in the applicable Utah case law, 
in the case of "concealment or misleading conduct" or "exceptional circumstances." See Russell Packard 
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14. 
This resolution shall take effect on September 13, 2013. 
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